Inferences with Information by Auletta, Gennaro
ISSN 2250-0987  








#University of Cassino. Philosophy Department 
 
Abstract— This paper develops a connection between 
logical inferences and information transmission/sharing. It 
can turn out to be very helpful when our problem is to do 
the best guess about the meaning of a message. 
Keywords— Equivocation, Venn diagram, premises, 
conclusion, inference. 
 
Information deals with continuous quantities 
(when integrals of probabilities are used) or in 
many cases with infinite countable sets (when 
sums are considered). Logic, on the contrary, 
deals with propositions or statements that can 
only assume two ―values‖, truth or falsity. 
Nevertheless, a connection between logic and 
information can be very helpful when dealing 
with situations in which we actually perform 
inferences or guesses about information, e.g. 
when we would like to infer the correct 
meaning of a message.  
In order to build a fruitful and robust 
connection between logic and information 
theory, we must ask about the general 
significance of some logical expressions and 
how they could be interpreted in terms of 
information transmission (the most basic form 
of dealing with information). A traditional 
way to write the main statements involved in 
logic calculations is: 
(∀t)(Xt → Yt),  (∀t)(Xt → ¬Yt),  
(∃t)(Xt ∧ Yt), (∃t)(Xt ∧ ¬Yt), 
The reason why I am considering the above 
expressions and not forms taken form the 
basic propositional logic is that they allow a 
direct use of Venn diagrams that are very 
helpful for solving our problem. However, for 
the sake of simplicity here and in the 
following I avoid to make use of quantifiers. 
Then, for practical purposes I take the terms 
(each of which stands for some subject or 
some predicate) X, Y, and Z to be kinds of 
propositions meaning: ―The object t is 
member of the class X‖, ―The object t is 
member of the class Y‖, or ―The object t is 
member of the class Z‖, and reformulate the 
above statements as 
X → Y, X → ¬Y, X ∧ Y, X ∧ ¬Y. 
Therefore, each logical term is referred to 
some class and for this reason I shall also use 
X, Y or Z as a shorthand for denoting the 
relative class (and therefore it has to be taken 
as a logical term). When in some situations 
ambiguities arise one can make use more 
specific distinctions, for instance introducing 
an indices like X1 and X2. 
When we say that X → Y, we mean that X 
is sufficient condition of Y. This tells that if Y 
is true we cannot say nothing about X, which 
can be either true or false. Then, the 
implication X → Y can be represented in 
information theory with the concept of 
equivocation (conditional entropy): H(X|Y), 
which expresses the incertitude or randomness 
of the output X relative to the input Y. Similar 
formulations are true for all other implications, 
some of which I resume here: 
  X → Y H(X|Y) 
  Y → X H(Y|X) 
  Z → Y  H(Z|Y) 
  Z → X  H(Z|X). 
This clearly shows that it is not information 
that is ―transmitted‖ during a process of 
information exchange but at most 
equivocation. Information makes only sense 
from the perspective of a potential receiver 
(from the point of view of the code X relative 
to an input Y). As far as we do not consider 
such a situation, what we actually transmit 
(from the point of view of the sender or of the 
source) is only a physical signal that can 
eventually acquire an informational value only 
when it is considered (and foremost codified) 
from the point of view of the receiver. This is 
also clear when we consider the fact that 
during any process of information exchange 
there is always information dispersion and 
therefore growth of entropy, what shows that 
we cannot say in any sense that is information 
to be transmitted. At the opposite, it is 
equivocation to be ―transmitted‖ to the extent 
to which it never decreases (generally, it 
increases across some communicative steps). 
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To express this more accurately, I can say that 
equivocation is present in any information 
transmission or exchange so that the 
conditional entropies above are a good 
expression of such a process. On the contrary, 
when information is only shared, equivocation 
does not necessarily occur (apart from 
degradation processes due to physical-
thermodynamic factors). Another form to say 
this is the following: apart from the 
information that is already shared (which 
however in itself does not add new knowledge) 
all the rest in any information exchange is 
necessarily equivocation (since it falls outside 
the information that we share). It is clear that 
we can in fact get new information during 
some information exchange. However, what 
happens is that we are able to expand the 
information that we share with the sender 
thanks either to a new communication or to 
some additional information that we share 
with a third party that allows us to reduce the 
equivocation present in the first message. In 
other words, any information exchange is 
ultimately a kind of error correction. 
Unfortunately, a causal-mechanical 
understanding of information exchange has 
misunderstood this basic point by assuming 
that information somehow ―propagates‖ from 
a source to a receiver. In very elementary and 
limiting cases we can say this only in a 
figurative sense, but to assume that this 
describes communication is certainly wrong.  
A totally different treatment deserves the 
implication X → ¬Y. Indeed, such an 
implication when translated in the language of 
information theory expresses a certitude about 
the relation between input Y and output X. 
Indeed, suppose that Y is logically true. This 
determines that X is false. Translated in terms 
of information, we have that the variability of 
the output X is univocally correlated with the 
variability of the input Y or that the variability 
of X is without equivocation. Then, the above 
implication X → ¬Y can be expressed as the 
information that X and Y share, or their 
mutual information: 
  X → ¬Y I(X:Y) 
  Y → ¬X I(X:Y) 
  Z → ¬Y I(Z:Y) 
  Z → ¬X I(Z:X). 
I recall that  
 I(X:Y) = H(X,Y) – H(X) – H(Y) 
or 
 H(X) = H(X|Y) + I(X:Y). 
All that means that the quantity H(X) can be 
associated to the logical form ¬X since it 
expresses the variability of X, and the same is 
true for H(Y) and H(Z). Indeed, if X 
represents a truth is fully deprived of potential 
informational value (in other words, the 
negation tells that the message has been 
already univocally determined).  
The joint entropy of X and Y: 
 H(X,Y) = H(X) + H(Y) – I(X:Y) 
   = H(Y) + H(X|Y) 
 = H(X|Y) + H(Y|X) + I(X:Y)  
can be put in relation with the logical 
expression  
  ¬X  ¬Y, 
since it expresses the incertitude of both X 
and Y.  
 
 
Fig. 1  A comparison of the logical and information-theory Venn’s 
diagrams. (a) Traditional logical expressions with their relative Venn-
diagram representation. (b) Traditional information-theory 
expressions. (c) Logical counterpart of the information-theory 
expressions. It is clear that the latter are contradictory relative to the 
traditional logical expression. For this reason, what in insert (a) is sum 
of subsets here is intersection and vice versa. I stress that what does 
matter here is the established correspondence between expressions 
and not areas: e.g. H(X|Y) corresponds to X → Y and not to X  ¬Y. 
The expressions involving three terms or 
sets are always a little more cumbersome but 
can be computed in a recursive way (see Fig. 
1):  
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H(X,Y,Z) = [H(X) – I(X:Y)] + [H(Y) – 
I(Y:Z)]  
                  + [H(Z) – I(X:Z)] 
                = H(X,Y) + H(Z|X,Y). 
This allows us to write the following 
expression: 
 H(Z|X,Y) – H(X,Y,Z) = – H(X,Y), 
which corresponds to the logical expression 
X  Y. This expression tells that nothing can 
be said about the relations between X and Y 
(neither whether or not a signal was sent).  We 
can build similar forms  
– H(Z,X) = H(Y|Z,X) – H(X,Y,Z)  
– H(Z,Y) = H(X|Z,Y) – H(X,Y,Z).  
Another interesting expression is  
d(X,Y) = H(X|Y) + H(Y|X), 
which is known as variation of information 
and helps us to build the counterpart of the 
logical form X  Y:  
 d(X,Y) – H(X,Y) = – I(X:Y). 
This expression tells us that there is no joint 
variability of X and Y or that both X and Y are 
deprived of potential informational value 
(which corresponds to a logical certitude). 
Moreover,   
H(Y) – H(X,Y) = – H(X|Y) 
corresponds to the logical form X  ¬Y. 
Similarly,  
  – H(Z|X) = H(X) – H(X,Y) 
  – H(Z|Y) = H(Y) – H(X,Y). 
Consider also the following relation: 
  H(X|Y,Z) + I(Z:X|Y) = H(X|Y), 
which corresponds to 
 (¬X  ¬Y  Z)  (¬X  Y  ¬Z) = ¬X 
 Y. 
Similarly, 
  H(Z|X,Y) + I(Y:Z|X) = H(Z|X), 
  H(Z|X,Y) + I(Z:X|Y) = H(Z|Y). 
It is also interesting to observe that  
  I(X:Y|Z) + I(X:Y:Z) = I(X:Y), 
  I(X:Z|Y) + I(X:Y:Z) = I(X:Z), 
  I(Z:Y|X) + I(X:Y:Z) = I(Z:Y). 
Let us also remark that: 
  I(X:Y:Z) = I(X:Y) – I(X:Y|Z), 
and similarly for I(Z:X) and I(Z:Y).  
I have already said that actual information 
transmission goes always with equivocation 
together. On the contrary, when there is 
mutual information we can only say that the 
conditions have been established (essentially 
we have built a channel) allowing to have such 
a communication. Therefore, to have a channel 
is a weaker condition that to actually transmit 
information (which requires a channel). 
However, it is a necessary condition for 
having such transmission. On the other hand, 
to deny that there is a channel is stronger 
statement than to deny that there information 
transmission.  
With these tools let us now try to express in 
information terms the inference: 
If X → Y and  Z → X, then Z → Y.  
In other words, what we would like to see is 
whether also in the conditional entropies 
involved in information transmission there is 
the same transitivity that we have in 
implications. Now, we see how fruitful was 
the assumption that the implication expresses 
equivocation. Indeed, faithful transmission or 
mutual information is not preserved across 
several communication steps, since, as 
mentioned, each transmission of information 
is subject to dispersion and noise that is 
always a kind of information loss. So, we 
cannot say that if Y is faithfully connected to 
X and X to Z, also Y is to Z. On the contrary, 
we can certainly say that if X represents the 
equivocation about the input Y and Z 
represents the equivocation about the input X, 
then Z equivocates Y at least for the amount 
given by the sum of the two previous 
equivocations but not less. Then, we are 
intuitively justified in affirming that  
 If H(Z|X) and H(X|Y), then H(Z|Y).  
Let us combine the premises: 
 H(X|Y) + H(Z|X) = H(Z|Y,X) + 
I(X:Z|Y)  
   + H(Z|X,Y) + 
I(Z:Y|X). 
Let us consider the second and third 
elements in the RHS of the previous 
expression. Their sum is 
  I(X:Z|Y) + H(Z|X,Y) = H(Z|Y),  
which is the desired result. Since we can 
write 
  H(X|Y) + H(Z|X) = H(Z|Y) + H(Z|X), 
it is clear that the conclusion plus one of the 
premises is equivalent to the sum of the 
premises, which justifies the inference. The 
interpretation of the above inference is quite 
straightforward: If there is information 
transmission from Y to X and from X to Z, we 
ISSN 2250-0987  




can say that there is also information 
transmission from Y to Z. We can express this 
by writing the inference in terms of the 
following inequality: 
  H(Z|X) + H(X|Y) ≥ H(Z|Y), 
as it is also clear by having a look at Fig. 2.  
 
 
Fig. 2: The inference H(Z|X) + H(X|Y) ≥ H(Z|Y). 
Let us now consider the following classical 
inference:  
If X → ¬Y and  Z → X, then Z → ¬Y.  
We expect that if X and Y share information, 
that is, I(X:Y), and there is some equivocation 
Z relative to X (H(Z|X)), also Z and Y will 
share some information. Let us reformulate the 
two premises as: 
I(X:Y) + H(Z|X) = I(X:Y|Z) + 
I(X:Y:Z) + H(Z|X,Y) + 
I(Z:Y|X). 
Now we can remark that the sum of the 
second and last elements gives:  
 I(X:Y:Z) + I(Z:Y|X) = I(Z:Y), 
which is the desired result. Now, we can 
write the premises as: 
 H(X,Z) – H(X|Y) = I(X:Y|Z) + 
H(Z|X,Y) + I(Z:Y). 
This identity shows that the RHS of the top 
line is again an alternative way to consider the 
dealing with information represented by the 
premises. Indeed, we can say that to have both 
X and Y that share information and Z that 
equivocates X is equivalent to say that Z that 
shares information with Y, that X and Y share 
information but not with Z, and that Z 
equivocates both X and Y. An alternative way 
to say this is that to have both X and Y that 
share information and Z that equivocates X is 
equivalent to affirm that Z equivocates both X 
and Y and Z and X jointly share information 
with Y: 
 I(X:Y) + H(Z|X) = I(X,Z:Y) + 
H(Z|X,Y), 
where 
 I(X,Z:Y) = I(X:Y) + I(Z:Y) – I(X:Y:Z). 
Note that we have succeeded in writing an 
equivalence between the sum of the two 
premises and the sum of other two terms that 
bear some structural similarity to them. The 
general significance of the above inference in 
terms of information theory is the following: if 
X shares information with Y and X transmits 
information to Z, then we can say that Z 
shares information with Y. As remarked, to 
share information is weaker than to actually 
transmit information (nothing ensures that the 
two partner will ever communicate). However, 
why we cannot say that to have a channel 
between X and Y as well as between Z and X 
implies that there is also a channel between X 
and Y? The fact that nothing ensures that the 
first two channels are really ―lined up‖. It is a 
fallacy comparable with that occurring in logic 
when trying to derive a conclusion only from 
particular premises. In other words, in order to 
formulate any statement about information 
sharing or exchanging we need an actual 
information transmission or exchange, and the 
same is true when we correct some 
equivocation. Also here we can write the 
inference as an inequality (see Fig. 3). 
  I(X:Y) + H(Z|X) ≥ I(Z:Y). 
 
 
Fig. 3:  The inference I(X:Y) + H(Z|X) ≥ I(Z:Y). 
More difficult to interpret is the equivalent 
of the classical inference: 
 If X → Y and  Z  X, then Z  Y. 
Our aim is to derive – I(Z:Y) from premises 
H(X|Y)  and – I(Z:X). To this purpose, let us 
write: 
H(X|Y) – I(Z:X) = H(X|Y) + H(X|Z) + 
H(Z|X) – H(X,Z) 
= H(X|Z,Y) + I(Z:X|Y) + 
H(X|Y,Z) + I(X:Y|Z) + 
H(Z|X,Y) + I(Z:Y|X) 
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       – H(X,Z). 
Now, I remark that  
 H(X|Z,Y) – H(X,Z) = H(Y|X,Z) – 
H(Z,Y), 
which allows us to write 
H(X|Y) – I(Z:X) = H(X|Z,Y) + I(Z:X|Y) + 
H(Y|X,Z) + I(X:Y|Z) + H(Z|X,Y) + I(Z:Y|X) – 
H(Z,Y). 
Since the expected conclusion can be 
written as 
 – I(Z:Y) = – H(Z,Y) + H(Z|Y) + 
H(Y|Z), 
we can reformulate the RHS of the previous 
equation: 
 H(X|Y) – I(Z:X) = H(X|Z,Y) + 
I(Z:Y|X) – I(Z:Y). 
The significance of this equation could be: 
To say that there is the equivocation X relative 
to Y and Z and X do not show correlated 
variability is equivalent to affirm that also Z 
and Y do not show correlated variability, X 
shows equivocation on both Z an Y and the 
latter two share information but not with X. A 
simpler way to say this is  
  H(X|Y) – I(Z:X) = H(X|Z,Y) – 
I(X:Y:Z). 
In other words, the RHS tells us that there is 
equivocation of X on both Z and Y and X,Y,Z 
have no common information. Indeed, to 
affirm that there is information transmission 
from Y to X but no mutual information 
between Z and X implies that there is also no 
mutual information between Z and Y. Again, 
we can rewrite this inference as an inequality 
(see Fig. 4). 
  H(X|Y) – I(Z:X) ≥ – I(Z:Y). 
 
 
Fig. 4  The inference H(X|Y) – I(Z:X) ≥ – I(Z:Y). Note that the region 
H(X|Y,Z) is counted two times in the premises. 
Another classical inference is: 
  If X → ¬Y and  Z → X, then Z 
→ ¬Y.  
In this case, we like to obtain the conclusion 
– H(Z|Y) from the premises I(X:Y) and – 
I(Z:X). Let us again sum the two premises: 
I(X:Y) – I(Z:X) = H(X) – H(X|Y) – H(X) + 
H(X|Z) 
    = – H(X|Y) + H(X|Z) 
    = – H(X|Y) + H(X,Y) – 
H(Z|X) – I(X:Y) 
    = – I(X:Y) – H(Z|X) + H(Y). 
Now, since  
 H(Y) = H(Z,Y) – H(Z|Y) 
and 
 H(Z,Y) = H(Z|X) + I(Z:X) + H(Y|Z), 
we can write: 
    I(X:Y) – I(Z:X) = – I(X:Y) – H(Z|X)  
       + H(Z|X) + I(Z:X) + H(Y|Z) 
– H(Z|Y) 
 = – I(X:Y) + I(Z:X) + H(Y|Z) – H(Z|Y) 
 = – I(X:Y|Z) – I(X:Y:Z) + I(Z:X|Y) + 
I(X:Y:Z)  
+ H(Y|X,Z) + I(X:Y|Z) – 
H(Z|Y) 
= I(Z:X|Y) + H(Y|X,Z) – H(Z|Y). 
The significance of this equation could be: 
To say that X and Y share information but Z 
and X do not is equivalent to say that there is 
no equivocation of Z on Y and both Z and X 
share information but not with Y and that 
there is equivocation of Y on both X and Z. 
The  general significance of the derivation is 
quite simple: To say that there is a mutual 
information between X and Y but no mutual 
information between Z and X amounts to say 
that there can be no information transmission 
from Y to Z. We can express also this 
inference as an inequality (see Fig. 5): 




Fig. 5  The inference I(X:Y) – I(Z:X) ≥ – H(Z|Y). Note that the region 
I(X:Y|Z) is counted two times in the premises. 
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Finally I only briefly present the 
informational analogue of inference 
 If X → Y and  Z ∧ X, then Z ∧ Y, 
which is: 
 If H(X|Y) and – H(Z|Y) then we have 
also – H(Z|X).  
This inference says that if there is 
information transmission from Y to X but no 
transmission from Y to Z, then there is also no 
information transmission from X to Z (see also 
Fig. 6). 
 
Fig. 6  The inference H(Z|X) – H(Z|Y) ≥ – H(X|Y). Note that the 
region H(X|Y,Z) is counted two times in the premises. 
The general lesson is that if one of the 
premises is the affirmation or the denial of the 
existence of shared information, also the 
conclusion will consist in the affirmation or 
denial of the existence of shared information. 
If one of the premises affirms the existence of 
shared information and the other one denies 
the existence of another kind of shared 
information, the conclusion will deny that 
there information transmission at all. A very 
easy rule for expressing this generalization is 
the following. Apart from the first inference 
and some few which can be derived from it, 
all other ones involve two times a shared 
information and one time a conditional 
entropy, it does not matter whether in the 
premises or in the conclusion. Let us take the 
second inference, i.e.  
I(X:Y) + H(Z|X) ≥ I(Z:Y) 
as paradigmatic. Then we can generated any 
other kind of inference by moving one of the 
terms on the LHS or the RHS into the opposite 
side according to the ordinary rules of 
inequalities. For instance, by moving the two 
mutual-information terms we obtain: 
  H(X|Y) – I(Z:Y) ≥ – I(Z:X), 
which is the third inference apart from a 
substitution of variables. Anyway, also this 
form is absolutely correct. By moving the 
conclusion and conditional-entropy term we 
obtain the fourth inference: 
I(X:Y) – I(Z:Y) ≥ – H(Z|X), 
apart from a change of variables which 
however does not affect the soundness of the 
derivation.  
As I have mentioned, the first inference and 
those derived from it have a different structure. 
Remark that the change of sign of two 
conditional-entropy of the first inference 
generates the fifth inference: 
H(X|Y) – H(Z|Y) ≥ – H(Z|X). 
We could also write: 
H(Z|X) – H(Z|Y) ≥ – H(X|Y), 
which is again fully correct.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
